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Environmental liabilities in insolvency – an area ripe for reform? 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper probes the perception that the law enables companies to shed their 
environmental liabilities through entry into insolvency proceedings. United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
company and insolvency law explicitly acknowledge the relevance of wider interests to a 
company’s long-term growth and the effects of its failure. For example, s.172 Companies 
Act 2006 mandates a director, in promoting the company’s success, to have regard to 
matters including ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment’.
1
 The Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice
2
 (‘Cork 
Report’) notes that the community has always been regarded as having ‘an important 
interest’ in insolvency proceedings.
3
 It accordingly includes, among the objectives of a good 
modern insolvency law, the need to recognise and safeguard the interests ‘of society or… 
groups in society [that] are vitally affected by insolvency and its outcome’.
4
 
 
The practical difficulty of achieving a balance between these community/social interests and 
the success or survival of companies when it comes to promoting environmental interests is 
however illustrated by a range of judicial decisions. This includes the attempt by People and 
Planet, an organization campaigning for action on climate change and respect for human 
rights, to ensure that the UK government exercised its power as a majority shareholder of 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (‘RBS’), in a way which compelled RBS’ board of directors to 
                                                                 
1
 s.172(1)(d). 
2
 Cmnd 8558, (1982). 
3
 ibid, paragraph 1734. 
4
 ibid, paragraph 198(i). 
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pursue policies which promoted environmental and human rights considerations in 
accordance with the s.172(1)(d) Companies Act 2006 duty.
 5
   This application for permission 
to bring judicial review proceedings failed on the basis that the imposition of the 
government’s own policies regarding combating climate change and promoting human 
rights would interfere with the RBS board of directors’ ability to manage the company for 
the benefit of its shareholders as a whole. In rejecting the interventionist policy proposed by 
People and Planet, the court upheld the ‘commercial approach’
6
 that the government had 
adopted in respect of its investment in RBS (made as a result of the ‘major financial 
support’
7
 extended to the bank in 2008). 
 
Likewise, in the absence of any special status for environmental claims in insolvency law, 
academic interest has centred on cases involving the use of the disclaimer provision s.178 
Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’). This empowers a liquidator to disclaim onerous property 
(defined as ‘any unprofitable contract’ or property which is unsaleable or capable of giving 
rise to financial or other onerous obligations
8
), thereby terminating the company’s rights, 
interests and obligations in respect of such property, and leaving anyone who has sustained 
loss or damage in consequence of the disclaimer to prove a claim as a creditor in the 
winding-up.
9
 Case law has highlighted the tension between the use of this power in 
liquidation to achieve the ‘orderly and expeditious winding up of a company’s affairs’
10
, and 
the ‘considerable public interest in the maintenance of a healthy environment’ denoted by 
                                                                 
5
 [2009] EWHC 3020. 
6
 Ibid, [6]-[36] 
7
 ibid, [1]. 
8
 s.178(3) IA 1986. 
9
 s.178(6) IA 1986. 
10
 Cork Report, (n.2) paragraph 1182. See e.g. Re Celtic Extraction [2001] Ch. 475, [42]. 
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the polluter pays principle.
11
 This latter objective is enforced for example through the 
existence of the statutory regime aimed at ensuring that ‘the disposal of controlled waste 
does not give rise to: (i) pollution of the environment; (ii) harm to human health and;  (iii) 
serious detriment to the amenities of the locality…collectively known in the waste 
management industry as "the three evils"’.
12
 This tension has been settled in favour of the 
former interest, meaning that the costs of compliance with a waste management licence 
could not take priority over the debts owed by a company, nor could the company’s assets 
be ‘set aside to pay for future compliance with the terms of the licence’.
13
 Thus, in the 
absence of clear words preventing s.178 from being applied to specific items of property or 
specific types of debtors, liquidators have been held to be entitled to disclaim waste 
management licences as onerous property.
14
  
 
It may be expected that the goal of environmental protection can be more easily achieved in 
circumstances where the emphasis is on rescuing, rather than liquidating, a financially 
distressed company to ensure its continued operation. Administration proceedings, for 
example, have the primary goal of ‘rescuing the company as a going concern’.
15
 The Cork 
Committee, which recommended the introduction of the administration procedure,
16
 was 
conscious of the potentially disastrous impact of the ‘chain reaction consequent upon any 
given failure’ on creditors, employees and the community,
17
 a policy embraced by the 
House of Lords in Powdrill v Watson: ‘This "rescue culture" which seeks to preserve viable 
                                                                 
11
 Re Mineral Resources Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 746, 757. 
12
 Re Rhondda Waste Disposal Ltd [2001] Ch.  57, [43]-[44]. 
13
 Ibid, [39]. 
14
 Re Celtic Extraction, (n.10). 
15
 IA 1986, Schedule B1, 3(1). 
16
 (n.2), Chapter 9.  
17
 Ibid, paragraph 204. 
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businesses was and is fundamental to much of the [Insolvency] Act of 1986.’
18
 However, in 
keeping with the notion that society is more concerned with the ‘preservation of the 
commercial enterprise’ rather than the rescue of the company per se,
19
 recent insolvencies 
demonstrate how administration proceedings can be used to sell the profitable parts of a 
business, in conjunction with liquidation proceedings aimed at the disclaimer of 
environmental liabilities. UK Coal Operations Ltd entered administration in July 2013, and 
swiftly carried out a ‘restructuring [of the majority of its business and assets] following 
sophisticated advice’
20
 before entering liquidation to enable the liquidators (who were the 
same individuals as the administrators) to disclaim onerous liabilities
21
 - in particular a 
damaged colliery, which would otherwise have cost more than £100,000 per week to 
maintain.
22
 Similarly, the liquidation of two major coal mining operators in 2013, Aardvark 
(TMC) Ltd (‘ATL’) and The Scottish Coal Company Ltd (‘SCC’), was structured in such a way 
that viable mining sites which were capable of being immediately transferred were sold to 
the purchaser Hargreaves Services plc (‘HSP’), while more problematic mining sites which 
were not capable of being transferred immediately were hived down to ATL/SCC 
subsidiaries – the shareholding in which would in due course be conveyed to HSP.
23
 The 
remaining sites which carried substantial restoration liabilities were disclaimed by the 
liquidators.
24
 While recourse to the disclaimer powers (which are only available in 
                                                                 
18
 [1995] 2 A.C. 394, 442. 
19
 Cork report (n.2) paragraph 193; S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’  (2004) 67 
Modern L.Rev. 247,  248-249. 
20
 Re UK Coal Operations Ltd [2013] EWHC 2581, [2]. 
21
 Re UK Coal Operations Ltd ibid, [5]. 
22
 Statement by PwC, Ocanti Opco Limited – in Liquidation (formerly UK Coal Operations Limited  available from 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/ukcoal.html (accessed 31 July 2016) 
23
 See news releases by HSP: Acquisition of Assets from Aardvark (TMC) Ltd (16 May, 2013) and Acquisition of 
Assets from The Scottish Coal Company Ltd  (5 July, 2013) - available from 
http://www.hsgplc.co.uk/investors/regulatory-news.aspx (accessed 31 July 2016); and Firmin v Aardvark 
(TMC) Ltd  [2013] EWHC 1774, [2]. 
24
 Ibid; Firmin v Aardvark (TMC) Ltd ibid, [5]. 
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liquidation proceedings)
25
 was justified on the ground of avoiding prejudice to unsecured 
creditors,
26
 it is evident that the transactions as a whole were viewed as being widely 
beneficial. A significant number of jobs were preserved and on-going production was 
secured,
27
 and the number of properties requiring disclaimer was minimized.
28
 
 
This handful of examples indicates, at the very least, that the interplay between 
company/insolve cy and environmental law is not quite clear-cut. In particular, the 
treatment of the mining sites in the recent UK Coal, Aardvark and Scottish Coal Company 
liquidations shows how insolvency proceedings are capable of being used in a rather 
strategic way, with a view to mitigating (rather than sidestepping) environmental liabilities. 
It has been questioned, based on previous case law,
29
 whether it should fall to the judiciary 
to resolve the ‘complex policy issues’ arising in the clashes between environmental and 
insolvency law.
 30
  In similar vein, it may be debated whether the distinct solutions arrived at 
                                                                 
25
 s.178(1) and (2) IA 1986 – ‘This [section applies] to a company that is being wound up in England and Wales 
… [T]he liquidator may, by the giving of the prescribed notice, disclaim any onerous property…’  
26
 See e.g. Firmin v Aardvark (TMC) Ltd, ((n.23) [6]): ‘The reason why the joint liquidators wish to disclaim the 
onerous properties immediately is to prevent them from generating liabilities which will prejudice the 
company’s creditors’; Re Directions, Nimmo [2013] CSOH 124, [7]: ‘The noters wish to protect SCC's unsecured 
creditors and the bank, as holder of the floating charge, from the dissipation of the proceeds of disposal of 
SCC's assets which continued performance of the statutory obligations will entail’; Statement by PwC, Ocanti 
Opco Limited – in Liquidation (formerly UK Coal Operations Limited (n.22): ‘The costs of securing and holding 
the [damaged] mine … would have been an expense and, as such, these costs would have been paid ahead of 
the dividend to creditors.’ 
27
 PwC statement, ibid: ‘As part of the restructuring the Administrators were able to protect around 1,500 
Company jobs …Over 400 jobs will also be preserved as part of the wider restructuring, under a separate 
insolvency process’; news release by HSP (n.23): Acquisition of Assets from Aardvark (TMC) Ltd (16 May, 2013) 
– ‘Hargreaves has committed to offer employment to 237members of staff’ on completion of restructuring.   
28
 News release by HSP, ibid: ‘In comparison with an unstructured liquidation, we have saved or created over 
230 jobs and been able to continue mining operations at two of the key sites. The number of properties that 
have had to be disclaimed by the liquidators have been significantly reduced.’ 
29
 Re Celtic Extraction (n.10); Re Mineral Resources (n.11); Re Rhondda Waste Disposal (n.12); Environment 
Agency v Hillridge Ltd [2003] EWHC 3023; Re Wilmott Trading Ltd (in liquidation) (Nos 1 and 2) [1999] 2 
B.C.L.C. 541. 
30
 J. Armour, ‘Who Pays When Polluters Go Bust?’ (2000) 11 L.Q.R. 200, 204. See also A. Keay and P. de Prez, 
‘Insolvency and Environmental Principles: a Case Study in a Conflict of Public Interests’ [2001] 3 Env L Rev 90; 
A. Keay and P. de Prez, ‘Should Insolvent Companies Pay? The Search for Environmental Principle’ (2001) 9(1) 
Env. Liability 11. 
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in the UK Coal, Aardvark and Scottish Coal Company liquidations, led by debtors and 
purchasers of their businesses/assets with limited court involvement, form the most 
advantageous response.
31
 The central issue, of how best to manage conflicts between 
environmental and insolvency law, should be considered in light of recent lessons from the 
United States (‘US’), outlined below.  
 
II. ‘Scary stories’ in the US 
The research for this paper was motivated by an empirical study conducted in the US by 
Lawton and Oswald, published in 2008.
32
 Against the background of criticisms and calls for 
the reform of environmental, corporate and bankruptcy law triggered by high-profile cases, 
they sought to determine ‘whether firms are indeed inappropriately using bankruptcy as a 
way to escape environmental liabilities on any sort of pervasive, wide-scale basis’.
33
 They 
argued that radical revisions of these areas of law should be preceded (and justified with 
reference to) some investigation into the existence and nature of the problem, compared to 
the ‘scary stories’ which had so far dominated the discussion surrounding the subject.
34
 This 
is echoed in an analysis of the role of empirical data in formulating bankruptcy policy, which 
observes that policy responses premised on anecdotes risk being disproportionate: ‘A 
statute may deploy vast enforcement resources to prevent or punish behaviours that rarely 
                                                                 
31
 See for example Firmin v Aardvark (TMC) Ltd, (n.23) – the court granted the liquidators permission to 
exercise certain powers prior to the holding of a creditors’ meeting under the IA 1986; and Re UK Coal 
Operations Ltd (n.20)– the court grant the administrators permission, in the interests of commercial necessity 
to dispense with the requirements to send proposals to creditors regarding the purpose of the administration 
and convene creditors’ meetings to consider such proposals, in accordance with the IA 1986. 
32
 A. Lawton and L. Oswald, ‘Scary Stories and the Limited Liability Polluter in Chapter 11’ (2008) 65 Wash.& 
Lee L.Rev. 451. 
33
 Ibid, 457. 
34
 Ibid ,454. 
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occur.’
35
 It was therefore crucial to look beyond the unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal 
reports of the routine evasion of environmental liabilities through the initiation of 
bankruptcy proceedings.
36
  
Lawton and Oswald recognised the difficulties of collecting data regarding environmental 
liabilities which could arise at state or federal level, through statute or common law, and 
take the form of various obligations such as penalties, repayment of clean-up costs and 
remediation orders.
37
 Coupled with the absence of official data on bankruptcy cases 
involving environmental issues, this meant that it was necessary to conduct this exploratory 
study with ‘a narrow but manageable set of data’.
38
 They accordingly focused on Chapter 
11
39
 bankruptcy reorganisation cases filed during the year 2004, with a view to ascertaining 
the following: 
First, how many firms in the data set reported environmental violations, 
liabilities, or other obligations? Second, of these firms, in how many 
instances did the environmental issues play a role in the bankruptcy filing? 
Third, of the firms in which environmental matters caused, even in part, 
the bankruptcy filing, in how many cases did the debtor end up shifting the 
cost of the environmental cleanup to the taxpayer? Fourth, even if 
environmental obligations did not play a role in the decision to file for 
bankruptcy, did the debtor avoid paying for environmental remediation 
either by invoking the Bankruptcy Code’s abandonment power or the right 
                                                                 
35
 T. Sullivan, E. Warren, J. Westbrook, ‘The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 50 
L.C.P. 195, 207. 
36
 Lawton and Oswald, (n.32) 456. 
37
 Ibid, 457. 
38
 Ibid, 458. 
39
 US Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 Chapter 11 U.S.C. 
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to discharge? Finally, is there any evidence that parent corporations 
effectively shift the cost of environmental cleanup to the taxpayers by 
creating subsidiaries with insufficient assets to pay for their environmental 
obligations?
40
 
The findings of the study challenged many widely-held beliefs regarding the scale of the 
problem and the pressing need for legal reform.  One view, for example, was that 
companies routinely avoided environmental liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, effectively 
exploiting the ‘loophole’ whereby debt obligations are discharged through insolvency.
41
 The 
study in fact found that environmental liabilities or violations influenced the decision to 
enter into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in less than 1% of the cases studied.
42
 
Similarly, there was little support for the notion that the bankruptcy process enables the 
burden of the costs of environmental remediation to be pushed onto taxpayers through 
State intervention to clean up sites: overall, the bankruptcy process did not enable such 
debtors to transfer the burden of environmental remediation costs to taxpayers through 
State intervention.
43
 In fact, the discharge of environmental debts occurred in less than 2% 
of the cases examined, indicating that ‘the shedding of environmental liabilities through the 
bankruptcy discharge simply is not a common problem’.
44
 However, on the rare occasions 
where debtors successfully discharged their environmental obligations, the debts were 
substantial
45
 (though it was questionable whether this could justify comprehensive legal 
                                                                 
40
 Lawton and Oswald, (n.32) 458. 
41
 Ibid, 472-473; K. Bergmann, ‘Bankruptcy, limited liability and CERCLA: closing the loophole and parting the 
veil’ (2004) University of Maryland Public Law and Legal Theory Accepted and Working Research Paper Series 
No. 2004-02, 12-19. 
42
 Lawton and Oswald, ibid 494. 
43
 Ibid, 510. 
44
 Ibid, 522. 
45
 Ibid, 522-525. 
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reform
46
). Thirdly, the abandonment of contaminated property in Chapter 11 proceedings in 
accordance with §554 of the US Bankruptcy Code,
47
 a procedure broadly similar to the 
power of disclaimer under UK Insolvency Act s.178 (outlined in Part I above), and seen in the 
US as ‘a loophole through which debtors pass in order to avoid their cleanup obligations 
under state and federal environmental laws’,
48
 was found to be ‘an extremely rare event’.
49
 
It had been successfully invoked ‘[i]n only one case – less than one tenth of one percent of 
the total number of cases’.
50
 Finally, in terms of corporate structure and organisation, the 
perception that companies endeavoured to structure their operations in such a way as to 
ensure that the risks or burden of environmental liabilities were borne by subsidiaries with 
insufficient assets to fulfil their obligations, thereby shielding the parent company’s assets,
51
 
was examined. Of the small minority of firms in the data set where environmental liabilities 
or violations had influenced the decision to file for bankruptcy, none was a subsidiary.
52
 
Thus, the data did not substantiate the impression ‘that the world of Chapter 11 
[bankruptcy] is disproportionately populated by shell subsidiary corporations with 
significant environmental liabilities’.
53
 
 Lawton and Oswald accordingly concluded that in the absence of ‘any empirical evidence 
demonstrating more widespread abuse, proposals for the reform of bankruptcy, 
environmental or corporate law are based on nothing more than scary stories’
54
. Their study 
                                                                 
46
 Ibid, 525. 
47
 §554 (a):’After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome 
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate’, broadly similar to disclaimer power 
in IA 1986, s.178. 
48
 474; Bergmann, (n.41) 12 
49
 Lawton and Oswald, (n.32) 514. 
50
 Ibid, 458. 
51
 Ibid, 454 and 456. See Bergmann (n.41), 20: this can deter parent companies ‘from practicing responsible 
environmental management or from supervising subsidiaries to ensure sound environmental practices’. 
52
 Lawton and Oswald ibid, 494. 
53
 Ibid, 526. 
54
 Ibid, 527. 
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cast doubts on the view of bankruptcy (‘insolvency’ in the UK) as ‘the last loophole for 
polluters’,
55 
which facilitates the discharge of a company’s obligations through its 
restructuring, winding-up or dissolution,
56
 bringing about the externalization of the costs of 
environmental obligations which should borne by polluters.
57
 This outcome is of interest 
from a UK perspective, given the similarities in context.  
 
III. The insolvency ‘shelter’ from environmental obligations in the UK 
Lawton and Oswald’s observation that there were no data disclosing the real extent of the 
use of bankruptcy proceedings to escape environmental liabilities, ‘only unsupported 
assertions and anecdotal “evidence”’
58
  is reflected in the UK where, beyond a few reported 
cases,
59
 there is no statistical evidence of the extent to which insolvency mechanisms do in 
fact facilitate the discharge of environmental claims.
60
 Nor is there any official data 
regarding the number of insolvency cases involving environmental claims; this information 
would have to be extracted from the individual public records of corporate insolvency 
                                                                 
55
 Bergmann (n.41), 2; D. Baker, ‘Bankruptcy – the Last Environmental Loophole?’ (1993) 34 S.Tex.L.Rev.379. 
56
 J. Van Patten and R. Puetz, ‘Bankruptcy and Environmental Obligations: the Clash between Private Relief and 
Public Policy’ (1990) 35 S.D.L.Rev. 220, 220. 
57
 See e.g. J. Boyd, ‘Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: The American Oil Pollution Act as an Example for 
Global Solutions?’: ‘Bankruptcy and corporate dissolution defeat the law’s ability to force polluter cost 
internalization by allowing many firms to abandon environmental responsibilities after reaping short-term 
financial gains. Nonrecoverable environmental obligations are more than a theoretical possibility. The U.S. 
landscape is littered with environmentally damaging operations that were either abandoned entirely or left 
unreclaimed due to bankruptcy’; M. Faure and J. Hu (eds) Prevention and Compensation of Marine Pollution 
Damage: Recent Developments in Europe, China and the US (Kluwer, 2008), 157.
 
58
 (n.32), 456. 
59
 In addition to those cited in n.29, see County Durham Environmental Trust Ltd v Twizell [2009] EWHC 2173. 
60
 See however Shelbourn’s comments linking increased ‘burden of environmental protection’ with growth in 
the number of companies in financial difficulties, and referring to the departure of a number of landfill 
operators from the sector (some via the insolvency route) as a result of increased regulation: C. Shelbourn, 
‘Waste Management and the Insolvent Company’ 2000 J.P.L 134, 138; and C. Shelbourn, ‘Waste Management 
Sites, Insolvency and Long Term Financial Provisions - the Story Continues...’ 2004 J.P.L. 697, 706. 
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cases.
61
 While the Insolvency Service is currently releasing company liquidation statistics 
broken down by industrial sector,
62
 environmental claims can arise in a variety of areas, 
such as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, transportation, energy or water supply. The 
absence of numerical data which provides a breakdown of the different types of creditors 
involved in a particular insolvency proceeding is an additional constraint.
63
  
Similarly, the conflict which Lawton and Oswald identified between environmental 
legislation which aims to impose responsibility for remedying contamination in accordance 
with the polluter pays principle, and the ‘fresh start’ provided for debtors by the bankruptcy 
regime, releasing them from their debts and ensuring equitable distribution of their assets 
among their creditors,
64
 is evident in some UK cases. As mentioned in Part I above, this 
includes cases where the courts have been called upon to resolve the question ‘whether a 
Waste Management Licence granted pursuant to the provisions of [Part] 11 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 … and held by a company can be disclaimed by a 
liquidator of that company pursuant to s.178 of the Insolvency Act 1986’.
65
 In Re Celtic 
Extraction Ltd,
66
 the established authority on this point, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
a liquidator could disclaim a waste management licence on the basis that it was onerous 
property, finding that it could not be inferred from the legislation that the application of the 
‘polluter pays’ principle extended to cases where the polluter could not pay, thus shifting 
the costs onto its unsecured creditors.
67
 This decision was considered to have provided ‘a 
potentially useful mechanism by which insolvency practitioners may avoid environmental 
                                                                 
61
 R. Tarling, ‘The absence of insolvency data’ 2013 Co Law 234. 
62
 ‘Industry breakdown’ link accessible from, e.g., https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-
statistics-january-to-march-2016 (accessed 31 July 2016). 
63
 Tarling, (n.61). 
64
 Lawton and Oswald, (n.32) 460. 
65
 Re Mineral Resources, (n.11) [1] – emphasis added.  
66
 Re Celtic Extraction (n.10).  
67
 Re Celtic Extraction ibid, [39]. 
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liabilities facing companies in liquidation’.
68
 Furthermore, the observation that the outcome 
of this case would create perverse incentives for creditors to push for their debtors’ 
liquidation ‘in order to reduce the quantum of clean-up costs which they would have to bear 
in administration or similar proceedings’ and thereby protect the debts they would recover 
from being further diminished
69
 is borne out in the recent Scottish Coal and UK Coal 
insolvencies. As sketched in Part I above, in these instances liquidation proceedings were 
embarked on for the purpose of enabling the disclaimer power (which applies only to 
companies which are being wound up
70
) to be used to minimise the insolvent estate’s 
exposure to clean-up costs – a motivation acknowledged in the litigation concerning the 
abandonment of statutory licences and land held by the Scottish Coal Company Ltd.
71
  
The disclaimer facility also enabled the liquidators of UK Coal Ltd to dispense with a fire-
damaged colliery on the basis that this ‘was a high risk site with substantial liabilities 
attaching to it. The costs of securing and holding the mine … would have been an expense 
and, as such … would have been paid ahead of the dividend to creditors’.
72
 Similarly to the 
case of Scottish Coal, this entry into liquidation for the purpose of disclaiming sites and/or 
statutory licences proved necessary notwithstanding the fact that it had been possible to 
sell or restructure the bulk of the debtors’ business or assets.
73
 Thus, although the case law 
                                                                 
68
 Shelbourn, ‘Waste Management and the Insolvent Company’ (n.60), 138. 
69
 (n.30), 204 (original emphasis). 
70
 See (n.25). 
71
 Re Directions, Nimmo  (n.26), [6]-[7] – ‘SCC’s directors applied for the company to be wound up rather than 
appoint an administrator because it was insolvent and did not wish the cost of performing its environmental 
obligations to use up the funds realised from the sale of its assets. . . . . The [liquidators] wish to protect SCC's 
unsecured creditors and the bank, as holder of the floating charge, from the dissipation of the proceeds of 
disposal of SCC's assets which continued performance of the statutory obligations will entail.’ appeal judgment 
Re Scottish Environment Protection Agency [2013] CSIH 108. 
72
 http://www.pwc.co.uk/business-recovery/administrations/ukcoal/index.jhtml (accessed 31 July 2016). See 
also Firmin v Aardvark TMC Ltd (n.23), [6] and [20]-[21].  
73
 PWC statement http://www.pwc.co.uk/business-recovery/administrations/ukcoal/index.jhtml; news release 
by purchaser Hargreaves Services plc ‘Acquisition of Assets from The Scottish Coal Company Limited) in 
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regarding the conflict between environmental law and insolvency law has grappled with the 
question of whether the Environmental Protection Act 1990 should prevail over the 
Insolvency Act 1986,
74
 as outlined in Part I above with reference to the recent liquidations of 
UK Coal Ltd, Aardvark (TMC) Ltd and Scottish Coal, it has to some extent proved possible in 
practice for the parties to a corporate insolvency (i.e. the administrators/liquidators, debtor 
organizations, and purchasers of the business/assets) to mediate these competing interests. 
Against the backdrop of prominent cases such as Re Celtic Extraction Ltd, it is unsurprising 
that calls for the UK legislature to address the conflict between environmental and 
insolvency law have been based on significant judicial decisions, rather than widespread 
perceptions of the abuse or strategic use of insolvency proceedings. Specific concerns relate 
to the resolution of the conflict between these areas of law by the judiciary rather than 
through legislation,
75
 particularly where this creates uncertainty regarding the status of 
environmental claims.
76
 The questions whether an environmental regulator is entitled to 
prove its claim in liquidation as an unsecured creditor following successful disclaimer of a 
statutory licence,
77
 or environmental liabilities enjoy some priority status as liquidation 
expenses,
78
 have not been conclusively settled. Prompted by the most recent judgment (in 
the Scottish Coal Company liquidation) regarding the question whether the fulfilment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
liquidation) (“Scottish Coal”)’ 5 July 2013; available from http://hsprod.investis.com/ir/hsp/ir.jsp?page=news-
item&item=1546188226560000 (accessed 31 July 2016); Firmin v Aardvark ibid, [5]. 
74
 See e.g. Re Wilmott Trading Ltd (n.29), 553, referring to the conclusion in Re Mineral Resources (n.11) ‘that 
where the insolvency legislation appeared to collide with the environmental protection legislation … the 
environmental protection legislation should prevail’; and the rejection in Re Celtic Extraction (n.10), [46]) of 
the notion that s.35(11) Environmental Protection Act and s.178 Insolvency Act 1986 ‘are mutually inconsistent 
and irreconcilable’. 
75
 Shelbourn ‘Waste Management Sites, Insolvency and Long Term Financial Provisions …’ (n.60), 707; Keay 
and de Prez, (n.30), 101-111. 
76
 Armour, (n.30) 203-204. 
77
 D. Case and P. de Prez, ‘The Power of Disclaimer and Environmental Licences’  2000 Insolv.L. 87, 90; Re 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (n.71), [146]; Re Mineral Resources Ltd (n.11), 758-760.  
78
 Re Scottish Environment Protection Agency ibid, [143]-[145]; P. Cranston, ‘The impudence of liquidators: the 
scope and limits of disclaimer’ (2014) 7 C.R.& I. 3.   
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environmental liabilities should prevail over repayment to creditors, the UK Insolvency 
Lawyers Association urged that any compelling ‘policy arguments for making creditors meet 
environmental liabilities before the state steps in … should be [adopted as] a matter of 
conscious insolvency policy, following debate and bearing in mind the potentially significant 
and unpredictable nature of such environmental liabilities’.
79
  
Adding to this cautionary note, this paper argues that any shift in insolvency policy towards 
allowing environmental liabilities to be satisfied before repayment to creditors, should 
furthermore be informed by an analysis of the means by which environmental law and 
policy mechanisms enable the scale of such liabilities to be minimised, and thus affect the 
need for reform. It begins by highlighting and evaluating some relevant factors below.  
 
IV. Factors limiting the incidence of environmental claims in the UK 
Baird contends that where environmental regulations are seen to have a limited effect in 
the context of insolvency, firms may be encouraged to initiate proceedings to avoid their 
obligations.
80
 Conversely, as argued in this paper, the effectiveness of the policies and 
regulations which apply outside insolvency can reduce the motivation or likelihood for 
companies to resort to proceedings as a means of escaping their environmental obligations. 
It is therefore worth examining how far insolvency risks are directly considered and/or 
mitigated through tools such as (a) the operation of the contaminated land regime, (b) 
criminal sentencing practice, and (c) the growing emphasis on the environment as a tool for 
economic growth. These are considered in turn below. 
                                                                 
79
 ‘Scottish Coal Company - Disclaimer, environmental liabilities and liquidation expenses’ Bulletin No. 533 
(2014). 
80
 D. Baird, ‘A World Without Bankruptcy (1987) 50 L.C.P. 173,190-191. 
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 IV(a) Role of the contaminated land regime 
The regime for dealing with historical problems of contaminated land occupies an important 
place among the different types of financial obligations related to the environment which 
can arise. The costs of remediating contaminated land can be substantial – running into 
millions of pounds,
81
 and therefore potentially overwhelming for a debtor. The original 
polluter of the land may be incapable of fulfilling its responsibility to bear these costs
82
  - a 
problem which can be especially acute with respect to polluting businesses which have 
ceased trading.
83
 From the perspective of an enforcement authority, it becomes necessary 
to attach responsibility to another ‘appropriate person’ such as an owner or occupier of the 
contaminated land.
84
 However, the complexity of the process of identifying and imposing 
liability on appropriate persons can involve local authorities in expensive legal wrangles,
85
 
and this can prove a deterrent to enforcement activities aimed at ensuring that 
contaminated sites are cleaned up.
86
 More generally, inherent flaws in the statutory regime 
for the remediation of contaminated land (laid down in Part 2A Environmental Protection 
Act 1990) may be seen to have rendered it unworkable, to the extent of hampering its 
                                                                 
81
 The regime is aimed at dealing with land ‘that poses a significant risk to health or the environment, where 
there is no alternative solution’ – Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental 
Protection Act 1990: Part 2A Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance (Crown, 2012), 2. Recent examples of 
extensive liability include a polluted limestone quarry in Wales – ‘NRW finally recoups costs for toxic quarry’ 
ENDS  (25 August 2015), and a 20 kilometre plume of contaminated groundwater in Hertfordshire – ‘Redland 
and Crest to start site clean-up’ ENDS (26 March 2010). 
82
 In accordance with its obligations under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (‘EPA 1990’), s.78F(2)-(3). 
83
 S. Evans, ‘Contaminated land: how to fix Part 2A’ 2014 ENDS 467, 38.  See e.g. Environment Agency v 
Hillridge (n.29), where the trust fund set aside under the conditions of a waste management licence became 
vested in the Crown as bona vacantia once the licence was disclaimed in the company’s liquidation – thwarting 
the Environment Agency’s recourse to the fund for the purpose of cleaning up the contaminated land. 
84
 In accordance with the EPA 1990, s.78F(4)-5). 
85
 The history and operation of the Part 2A regime are comprehensively analysed by V. Fogleman: ‘The 
contaminated land regime: time for a regime that is fit for purpose’ Part 1: (2014) 6(2) I.J.L.B.E. 43, and Part 2: 
(2014) 6(2) I.J.L.B.E. 129.  
86
 S. Evans, ‘Insurance recovery: a blank cheque for contaminated land?’ ENDS (24 September 2013). In 
examples cited in n.81 above, the companies which were pursued by the regulators denied responsibility. 
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ability to facilitate the voluntary remediation of contaminated land.
87
 Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, two particular aspects of the regime’s operation play a considerable part 
in controlling the risk of insolvency arising from remediation obligations. For the purposes of 
this paper, it is therefore instructive to consider how the planning system enables the costs 
of cleaning up contaminated sites to be privately absorbed by developers, and the manner 
in which the hardship criteria embodied in the Part 2A statutory regime provide a means of 
anticipating and egating the possibility of claims for remedial costs being reflected among 
the debts payable in an insolvency.   
Recent reviews of the progress made in dealing with contaminated land in England and 
Wales have identified the planning system as foremost among the methods of remediating 
existing contamination.
88
 The use of the planning regime to deal with contaminated land by 
facilitating the development of such sites was estimated at 80-90% of contaminated sites in 
England and Wales between 2000 and 2007 (and 93% in Wales by the end of 2013).
89
 The 
Environment Agency regards this as 'a very cost-effective way to manage land 
contamination as those who will benefit from the development usually pay to remediate it’, 
compared with the taxpayer-funded cost of a regulatory intervention.
90
  
This use of the planning system is complemented by the Part 2A statutory regime for 
dealing with contaminated land, which is targeted at contamination posing unacceptable 
                                                                 
87
 V. Fogleman, ‘The contaminated land regime: time for a regime that is fit for purpose (Part 2)’ (2014) 6(2) 
I.J.L.B.E. 129, 135. 
88
 Dealing with Contaminated Land in England and Wales (Environment Agency, 2009), 5; The State of 
Contaminated Land in Wales (Natural Resources Wales, 2016), 10. 
89
 Dealing with Contaminated Land ibid, 6; The State of Contaminated Land, ibid. 
90
 Dealing with Contaminated Land ibid,5. See The State of Contaminated Land, (n.88): ‘…development of land 
through the planning process means that the cost of dealing with contaminated land is born (sic) by those 
likely to benefit from the redevelopment. Taking regulatory action is usually a last resort and can mean that 
the taxpayer has to bear some of the cost.’  
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risks to human health and the environment’.
91
 The policy objective underlying Part 2A of 
ensuring that ‘the burdens faced by individuals, companies and society as a whole are 
proportionate’
92
 is supported by the enforcement authorities’ power, in situations where 
they have engaged in remediation activities and are entitled to recover the reasonable costs 
thereof from the appropriate person(s), to have regard to ‘any hardship which the recovery 
may cause to the person from whom the cost is recoverable’, in deciding whether to seek 
recovery of some or all of the costs.
93
 With respect to small or medium-sized enterprises, 
relevant considerations include whether recovery of the full cost involved ‘would mean that 
the enterprise is likely to become insolvent and thus cease to exist; and … if so, the cost to 
the local economy of such a closure’.
94
 If the cost to the local economy of an enterprise’s 
closure appears to outweigh the remediation costs borne by the enforcing authority, ‘the 
authority should consider waiving or reducing its costs recovery to the extent needed to 
avoid making the enterprise insolvent’.
95
 Local authorities’ decisions regarding cost recovery 
may also be informed by relevant policies on promoting enterprise or encouraging 
economic development.
96
  
It would therefore seem unlikely that remediation costs would play a significant role in 
bringing about the insolvency of a company, or in fact have a strong presence among the 
environmental claims. This is reinforced by the indication in the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ (‘Defra’) cost recovery guidance that it is unnecessary 
to waive or reduce costs where ‘it appears that the enterprise would be likely to become 
insolvent whether or not recovery of the full cost takes place; or … that the enterprise could 
                                                                 
91
 Part 2A Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance (n.81), 1.4-1.5. 
92
 Ibid, 1.4. 
93
 EPA 1990, s.78(P)(2); ‘enforcing authority’ defined s.78A(9). 
94
 Part 2A Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance (n.81), 8.14. Small/medium-sized enterprise defined 8.17. 
95
 Ibid, 8.15. 
96
 Ibid, 8.18. 
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be kept in, or returned to, business even it does become insolvent under its current 
ownership’.
97
 Despite the long-standing concern that businesses are able to ‘escape 
environmental and other liabilities through careful corporate structuring’,
98
 enforcing 
authorities are precluded from waiving or reducing costs where they are ‘satisfied that an 
enterprise has deliberately arranged matters so as to avoid responsibility for the costs of 
remediation’.
99
 
Thus, a closer study of the handling of contaminated land in the UK shows that the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle is not strictly enforced, insofar as the costs of remediation may be 
shouldered by private sector developers or absorbed by the State through a costs waiver or 
reduction by an enforcing authority. This is borne out by recent evidence indicating that 
local authorities make limited efforts to recover remediation costs from current owners or 
occupiers of land, especially homeowners (rather than the parties directly responsible for 
the presence of the contaminating substance).
100
 Lees notes that this reticence is apparently 
premised on the assumption that it follows from the notion of fairness underlying the 
‘polluter pays’ principle that it would be ‘unfair to make an individual pay to clean up harm 
which was not caused by his or her actions’.
101
 The operation of the Part 2A regime 
furthermore reveals the extent to which at enforcement level, hardship criteria can be 
applied to avert insolvency in what may be considered ‘genuine’ cases: that is, instances 
where an enterprise would not face insolvency if it were not for its liability for remediation 
costs, or it is prevented by such liability from returning to a state of solvency.  
 
                                                                 
97
 Ibid, 8.16. 
98
 Lawton & Oswald, (n.32) 460-461 
99
 Part 2A Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance (n.81), 8.16. 
100
 E. Lees, ‘Interpreting the contaminated land regime: should the ‘polluter’ pay?’ 2012 Env. L. Rev. 98, 102. 
101
 Ibid, 103. 
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IV(b) Role of criminal sentencing policy and practice 
The impact of criminal sentencing policy and practice is likewise strongly relevant in 
considering the extent to which fines for environmental offences may cause or contribute to 
a company’s failure, or encourage recourse to insolvency proceedings. Although 
environmental enforcement techniques have been expanded through the introduction of 
the civil sanctions framework
102
 aimed at providing ‘a more proportionate and flexible 
response to cases of regulatory non-compliance normally dealt with in the criminal 
courts’,
103
 the criminal law continues to play a vital role in relation to serious breaches of 
environmental law.
104
 Hence, this analysis focuses on the effectiveness of criminal 
sentencing policy and practice in reducing the potential for sanctions arising from a 
company’s breach of its environmental obligations to contribute/lead to its insolvency. 
The strength of this element should be regarded against the backdrop of a recent review of 
sentencing for environmental offences in the UK. The review highlighted concerns that fines 
were not sufficiently high, did not reflect the severity of offences or have an adequate 
deterrent effect, and that there were inconsistencies in fines involving similar offences 
committed by similar offenders across the country.
105
 Research identified magistrates’ 
limited experience of sentencing environmental offences due to the infrequency with which 
these came to court, and their ‘lack of confidence’ in evaluating the seriousness  of offences 
                                                                 
102
 Introduced by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (‘RES Act’). 
103
 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 
2008: Guidance to the Act (Crown, 2008), 7; RES Act, Explanatory Notes paragraphs 3-9. 
104
 R. Macrory, ‘Sentencing guidance for large companies’ 2014 ENDS 469, 29. 
105
 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences Guideline Consultation (Crown, 2013), 5. 
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and appropriate levels of fines, especially with respect to corporate offenders.
106
 Levels of 
fines ‘in some relatively severe cases involving corporations were too low’.
107
  
Sentencing guidelines for environmental offences,
108
 released following the review, govern 
‘high volume offences’
109
 under key environmental legislation.
110
  The guidelines emphasise 
that compensation orders should be considered as a first step for injury, loss or damage, 
and prioritised over financial penalties where an offender is of limited means.
111
 This 
specific prompt
112
 may assist in overcoming past judicial unease regarding the role of the 
criminal courts in dealing with ‘complex compensation issues’,
113
 and lead to a 
predominance of compensation orders over fines in relation to financially distressed 
companies. In determining the appropriate level of fine to impose according to the 
seriousness of the offence, aggravating factors include evidence of its wider impact (e.g. on 
the community) or its commission for financial gain.
114
 Conversely, mitigating factors include 
steps taken to remedy the problem, voluntary payments made to remedy the harm caused, 
and the absence of commercial motivation or lack of financial gain.
115
 The guidelines 
furthermore dictate a series of steps whereby the court determines that its sanction 
‘removes any economic benefit derived from the offending’ and is proportionate to the 
offender’s means, notably taking account of the principle that  
                                                                 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Sentencing Council, Final resource assessment: Environmental Offences (Crown, 2014), 8.2. 
108
 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline (Crown, 2014). 
109
 I. Kaminski, ‘Sentencing guidelines raise fines for environmental offences’ ENDS Report (26 February 2014). 
110
 Environmental Offences: Definitive Guideline (n.108), 3 and 14. 
111
 Definitive Guideline ibid, 4. 
112
 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences: Response to Consultation (Crown, 2014), 4. 
113
 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2010] EWCA Crim 202, [39]. 
114
 Definitive Guideline (n.108), 11. 
115
 Ibid. As with aggravating factors, this list is non-exhaustive. In the first case applying these guidelines, R v 
Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960:  ‘In environmental pollution cases [relevant mitigating 
features] will include prompt and effective measures to rectify the harm caused by the offence and to prevent 
its recurrence, frankness and co-operation with the authorities, the prompt payment of full compensation to 
those harmed by the offence, and a prompt plea of guilty. In addition, significant expense voluntarily incurred 
– so-called “reparation” – in recognition of the public harm done should be taken into account…’ (at [[41]). 
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The combination of financial orders must be sufficiently substantial to have 
a real economic impact which will bring home to both management and 
shareholders the need to improve regulatory compliance. Whether the 
fine will have the effect of putting the offender out of business will be 
relevant; in some bad cases this may be an acceptable consequence.’
116
 
Further ‘factual elements’ relevant to increasing or reducing the proposed fine include the 
extent to which a fine impairs the offender’s ability to compensate victims or make the 
organisational changes necessary to improve compliance, and the impact of the fine on 
employees, customers/service users and the local economy.
117
 In considering an offender’s 
ability to pay a financial penalty, the court has ‘the power to allow time for payment or to 
order that the amount be paid in instalments’.
118
 The existence of corporate group 
relationships, viewed in academic literature as a means of curbing liability through the use 
of subsidiaries which are undercapitalised or subject to intra-group transfers of value,
119
  is 
relevant to the adjustment of fines insofar as a court considering an offender’s financial 
circumstances may be influenced by any demonstration ‘that the resources of a linked 
organisation are available and can properly be taken into account’.
120
  
                                                                 
116
 Definitive Guideline (n.108), 12 (emphasis added). 
117
 Ibid, 13. 
118
 Ibid, 12. 
119
 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, ‘Limited liability and the corporation’ (1985) 52 University of Chicago Law 
Review 89, 111; H. Anderson, ‘Parent Company Liability for Asbestos Claims: Some International Insights’ 
(2011) 31 LS 547, 551; A. Ringleb and S. Wiggins, ‘Liability and Large-Scale Long-Term Hazards’ (1990) 98 
J.Pol.Econ.574; M. Carey, ‘Piercing the Veil When Corporate Subsidiaries Commit Torts’ (2008) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309302, 32-33 (accessed 31 July 2016). See in particular Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
indication in 1991 that a large proportion of small firms entering all hazardous industries in the US were 
motivated primarily by a desire to avoid liability for consumer, employee and environmental harms; In 
addition, empirical evidence indicated that increasing exposure to tort liability (including potentially massive 
liability for environmental harms) had led to widespread reorganisation of businesses to evade damage claims 
– H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts’ (1991) 100 Yale 
L.J. 1879, 1881. 
120
 Definitive Guideline (n.108), 6. 
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The courts’ overall discretion to mould the sentence to individual circumstances
121
 suggests 
that the need for an insolvency shelter for companies subject to criminal sanctions is 
minimal. At the same time, the inadequate sentencing of corporate offenders prior to the 
introduction of the guidelines (among the reasons for reform in this area, as identified 
above), diminishes the possibility that an insolvency ‘loophole’ was relied on in the past as a 
means of evading criminal penalties. Historically in fact, an offender’s substantial voluntary 
reparation for harm could negate the need for a compensation order, and provide a strong 
mitigating factor in support of a reduction in the deterrent (and possibly punitive) element 
of a fine. In R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, decided in 2010,
122
  the offender’s 
‘unprecedented [voluntary] payment and pledge of the total sum of £500,000 – a sum vastly 
in excess of any which the court could have ordered by way of compensation’ was among 
the mitigating features weighed against the seriousness of the offence.
123
 The Court of 
Appeal noted that a misleading impression may be created in such circumstances where ‘on 
the face of the court record, a relatively modest sentence may have been imposed for what 
was, in fact, an offence which would normally attract a higher (or possibly much higher) 
sentence’.
124
 Thus, seemingly low fines might not adequately reflect the extent to which an 
offender has internalised the costs of its harmful activities, sometimes well beyond the 
amount of any potential compensation order.
125
 The implementation of the new sentencing 
guidelines may have the same impact: in the first decision involving their application, 
incidentally also R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, the Court of Appeal considered that ‘[c]lear 
and accepted evidence from the Chief Executive or Chairman of the main board that the 
                                                                 
121
 Environmental Offences: Response to Consultation (n.112), 8. 
122
 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2010] EWCA Crim 202. 
123
 Ibid, [50]. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Ibid, [49]. 
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main board was taking effective steps to secure substantial overall improvement in the 
company's fulfilment of its environmental duties would be a significant mitigating factor’.
126
 
While an escalation in the levels of fines imposed in cases involving offences committed by 
companies is predicted following the release of the new sentencing guidelines,
127
 the 
requirement for sentences to be proportionate
128
 will affect the levels of fines imposed on 
certain types of companies. For small companies, it is recognised that a ‘degree of overlap’ 
should be maintained between the range of sentences applicable to individual offenders 
and to small companies,
 129
  to prevent disparities between sentences for small companies 
and unincorporated enterprises with similar characteristics (e.g. sole trader or family-run 
business).
130
 This enables artificial distinctions to be avoided, but from the point of view of 
any investigation, it also means that data regarding the effect of environmental liabilities on 
small companies would not easily be generalizable.  
Non-generalizability is also evident in the  sentencing of  large companies, where in taking 
account of the financial circumstances of an offender,
131
 it is seen as being of  ‘particular 
importance’
132
 that fines should be fixed so as to ensure ‘ hat the message is brought home 
to the directors and members of the company (usually the shareholders)’.
133
 The recent 
Court of Appeal decision in R v Sellafield Ltd; R v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd
134
 illustrates 
how this objective is applied in relation to environmental and health and safety offences 
committed by companies with a turnover exceeding £1 billion.  
                                                                 
126
 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960, [41]. 
127
 Final resource assessment (n.107), 8.2. 
128
 Definitive Guideline (n.108), 12. 
129
 Guideline Consultation (n.105), 24. 
130
 Response to Consultation (n.112), 19-20; Definitive Guideline (n.108), 7-10.  
131
 s.164 Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
132
 R v Thames Water Utilities (n.126), [35]. 
133
 R v Sellafield Ltd; R v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2014] EWCA Crim 49, [6]. 
134
 ibid. 
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This matter involved appeals by Sellafield Ltd (‘SL’) and Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd 
(‘NRIL’) against fines between £500,000-£700,000 for breach of requirements for the 
storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and a collision at an unmanned level crossing 
respectively, on the basis that the fines were manifestly excessive.  Comparing the 
governance of SL with that of NRIL, the Court of Appeal considered that it was evident that 
the imposition of a fine would affect them differently. As an ‘ordinary commercial 
company’,
135
 SL’s shareholders enjoyed profits by way of dividend and were few enough in 
number to be able to hold the directors to account for criminal breaches and future 
compliance;
136
 whereas NRIL was owned by a parent body which was a ‘not for dividend 
company’
137
 and invested its profits in the railway infrastructure ‘for the public benefit’.
138
 A 
substantial fine could therefore harm the public interest by undermining investment in the 
rail network and creating a deficit which would necessitate support from State funds.
139
 The 
court nonetheless had regard to evidence that directors’ bonus remuneration had been 
reduced partly due to NRIL’s poor safety record, a material factor in cases ‘where a fine 
inflicts no direct punishment on anyone’: 
If…a bonus incentivises an executive director to perform better, the 
prospect of a significant reduction of a bonus will incentivise the executive 
directors on the board of companies such as Network Rail to pay the 
highest attention to protecting the lives of those who are at real risk from 
its activities. In short, it will demonstrate to the court the company's 
                                                                 
135
 Ibid, [7]. 
136
 Ibid, [56].  
137
 Ibid, [57]. 
138
 Ibid, [69]. 
139
 Ibid. 
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efforts, at the level of those ultimately responsible, to address its offending 
behaviour, to reform and rehabilitate itself and to protect the public.
140
  
Thus, with respect to companies fulfilling a ‘public’ role, apparently low levels of fines may 
be complemented by the financial loss borne by their management.  Together with the 
pressure exerted on directors by significant fines imposed on large commercial concerns 
such as SL (equivalent to slightly ‘more than a week’s profit and about 2% of its weekly 
income’
141
), these sentencing factors are capable of being among the less visible 
contributors to the changes in corporate conduct aimed at averting or minimising future 
liability. This is reinforced by the Court of Appeal judgment in R v Thames Water Utilities 
Ltd,
142
 which indicates that in sentencing very large commercial organisations run for profit, 
the courts are not bound to adhere to, or even to start from, the range of fines provided by 
the Sentencing Council in relation to large organisations.
143
 In the most severe of these 
cases, regard to an offender’s full financial circumstances
144
 could well result in a fine 
representing ‘a substantial percentage, up to 100%, of the company's pre-tax net profit for 
the year in question … even if this results in fines in excess of £100 million’.
145
 These are 
consistent with the size of fines imposed in the financial services sector for breach of 
regulations.
146
 In the same vein, it may be anticipated that the necessity of bringing home 
the aggravating effect of repeated offences to directors and shareholders in this context will 
bring about a significant increase in the level of fines, to an extent that would be ‘sufficient 
                                                                 
140
 Ibid, [70]. 
141
 Ibid, [65]. 
142
 (n.115). 
143
 Ibid, [36]. 
144
 Ibid, [40]. 
145
 Ibid. 
146
 Ibid. 
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to have a material impact on the finances of the company as a whole’.
147
 Dismissing this 
appeal against a £250,000 fine, the Court of Appeal asserted that it would not have 
hesitated to uphold ‘a very substantially higher fine’
148
 – an outcome in keeping with its 
stance in previous cases involving environmental offences, against interfering with fines 
markedly greater than six figures.
149
 The financial implications of criminal sentencing 
practice should accordingly produce a severely punitive or deterrent effect
150
 for large and 
very large compa ies, as compared with small and medium enterprises, a point emphasised 
in the judgment:  
Even in the case of a large organisation with a hitherto impeccable record, 
the fine must be large enough to bring the appropriate message home to 
the directors and shareholders and to punish them. In the case of repeat 
offenders, the fine should be far higher and should rise to the level 
necessary to ensure that the directors and shareholders of the organisation 
take effective measures properly to reform themselves and ensure that 
they fulfil their environmental obligations.
151
 
The impact of this approach has been noted by the Environment Agency’s director of legal 
services, who discerns that a significant result of the introduction of the sentencing 
guidelines has been ‘far greater engagement from senior managers of large companies’ in 
                                                                 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Ibid, [46]. 
149
 Ibid, [38]. 
150
 Purposes of sentencing set out in Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.142.  
151
 (n.115), [42]. See more recently I. Kaminski, ‘Yorkshire Water nets record-breaking £1.1 m fine for sewage 
pollution’ ENDS (29 April 2016). 
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response to demands from the courts for ‘repeat offenders to explain at a senior level what 
they are doing to prevent recurrences rather than leave mitigation to junior managers’.
152
 
These developments in criminal sentencing should not be viewed in isolation. Changes in 
enforcement strategies may help, more generally, to reduce the number of criminal fines 
imposed on companies. The recent fall in waste crime prosecutions in England for example, 
is attributed to the Environment Agency’s ‘proactive approach of targeting particular 
offenders’, reserving prosecution for ‘more prolific and serious offenders’.
153
 An 
improvement in the effectiveness of the Agency’s operations may be attributable to its 
increased reliance on intelligence resources, enhanced collaboration with other agencies, 
and new data collection and enforcement techniques.
154
 
The scale of prosecution activity with respect to environmental offences is accordingly 
limited in its capacity to reveal the full part played by criminal sanctions in triggering or 
encouraging entry into insolvency proceedings. While this may be seen as a consequence of 
the breadth and effectiveness of the remediation/enforcement strategies currently 
employed by regulators and judicial sentencing authorities, low penalty levels or numbers of 
criminal enforcement sanctions may also be ascribed to deficiencies in implementation such 
as those identified with respect to the nature of sentencing practice in the past. Inversely, 
offences may be committed in an effort to stave off financial distress – in a recent 
prosecution of a waste management company and its director for storing 80 tonnes of 
illegal hazardous waste despite a previous conviction (with a £10,000 fine) and warnings 
                                                                 
152
 P. Kellett, The EA’s approach to enforcement undertakings’ 2016 ENDS 493. 
153
 Cracking Down on Waste Crime: Waste Crime Report 2012-2013 (Environment Agency, 2013), 13. 
154
 Ibid, 13-17. 
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from the Environment Agency, it was admitted that deliveries of waste to the site had 
continued ‘for commercial reasons’ in order to avoid insolvency.
155
 
On this basis, it is submitted that it is the effectiveness of enforcement methods which calls 
for thorough examination and response. This argument is supported by the independent 
review of the regulation of opencast coal operations in East Ayrshire, conducted following 
the insolvent liquidation of the Scottish Coal Company Ltd (‘SCC’) and Aardvark (TMC) Ltd 
(‘ATL’) – both major coal-mining operators in the area – that highlighted several failings.
156
 
These included the ‘wholly deficient and defective’ process in place for calculating and 
monitoring restoration guarantee bonds,
157
 and ‘wholly inadequate’ monitoring of the sites 
which (together with the operators’ persistent breaches of their planning permission and 
statutory agreements) ‘created extensive environmental degradation’.
158
 A consultation 
launched by the Scottish Government in the wake of the collapse of SCC and ATL reflected 
on how regulation of the opencast coal sector could be strengthened to ensure greater 
restoration of sites, through various pre-emptive devices such as guarantees provided by 
the mining operator or its parent company, industry-led restoration schemes, the 
imposition of liability on landowners, increased community involvement through liaison 
committees and enhanced support for planning authorities or compliance monitoring 
activities.
159
  Inasmuch as regulatory action through civil sanctions
160
 or the prospect of 
                                                                 
155
 C. McGlone, ‘Cornish waste firm fined again for permit breach’ ENDS (21 April 2016) 
156
 J. Mackinnon, C. Norman and J. Fowlie, Report of Independent Review of Regulation of Opencast Coal 
Operations in East Ayrshire (2014). 
157
 Ibid, 4. 
158
 Ibid. 
159
 Consultation on Opencast Coal Restoration and Effective Regulation (Scottish Government, 2013) available 
at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0043/00439587.pdf (accessed 31 July 2016).  
160
 See e.g. O. Pedersen, ‘Environmental Enforcement Undertakings and Possible Implications: Responsive, 
Smarter or Rent Seeking?’ (2013) 76 (2) MLR 319, 342-343:  the self-reflection attendant on the process of 
formulating and agreeing an enforcement undertaking may bring about long-term changes in the organisation 
and conduct of offending bodies. I. Kaminski, ‘The growing role of enforcement undertakings’ ENDS (04 
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heavy criminal fines have spurred businesses to engage more actively with environmental 
compliance requirements, this example implants some hope that corporate failures of this 
nature will provide significant markers against which governmental authorities can measure 
the adequacy of their enforcement policies and procedures. Such governmental 
considerations will become increasingly important as recognition of the contribution that 
environmental policy and regulation can make to economic growth becomes more 
widespread, as discussed below. 
 
IV(c) The role of the environment as a tool for economic growth 
  IV(c)(i) Linking environmental interests with economic growth 
Increased emphasis in the UK on environmental policy and regulation as a tool for economic 
growth may further lessen insolvency risks (or incentives) for businesses. Contrary to the 
view that ‘economic growth is … necessarily at odds with the environment’, the central role 
of the natural environment in relation to economic activity and growth dictates that 
‘[e]conomic and environmental performance must go hand in hand’.
161
 This is 
acknowledged by Defra: 
Designing policies such that the regulatory burden on the economy is 
minimised is essential for realising all the potential growth benefits of 
environmental policy – in terms of improving overall economic efficiency 
and in terms of securing long-term growth. Through this, environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
February 2014) cites the example of an environmental consultancy seeking advice from local conservation 
groups on behalf of an offender. 
 
161
 T. Everett, M. Ishwaran, G. Ansaloni and A. Rubin, Economic Growth and the Environment Defra Evidence 
and Analysis Series Paper 2 (Defra, 2010), 5.  
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policy can help increase prosperity and wellbeing – not just greater 
incomes but improved health, education and quality of life – for future 
generations.
162
 
Measures aimed at easing regulatory burdens to enable economic growth considerations to 
be integrated more deeply into approaches to regulation, include the duty for non-economic 
regulators to ‘have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth’ in exercising 
their functions. This ‘growth’ duty, enacted through the Deregulation Act 2015,
163
 extends to 
regulators such as the Environment Agency and Natural England,
164
 seeking to ensure that 
their duties are performed in a proportionate manner and with due consideration to the 
economic consequences of their actions.
165
 Its introduction through primary legislation 
signals that ‘economic consequences can and should be a key factor taken into account in 
regulators’ decision-making’,
166
 empowering regulators to ‘support prosperity as well as to 
protect’ in the exercise of their regulatory functions.
167
 The duty is expected to propel 
regulators’ recourse towards interventions which favour growth as well as compliance,
168
 
and is thus consistent with the shift from ‘traditional enforcement methods and sanctions’
169
 
in the context of environmental protection. Its significance is underlined by the expectation 
that regulatory interventions which do not support growth should be justified.
170
 The belief 
that ‘protection and growth are not mutually exclusive’ and regulatory frameworks are 
capable of contributing to both goals, has also been echoed with respect to the recent 
                                                                 
162
 Ibid, 42. 
163
 s.108; Consultation Paper – Non-economic Regulators: Duty to Have Regard to Growth (Crown, 2013), 2.7; 
Government Response – Non-economic Regulators: Duty to Have Regard to Growth (Crown, 2013). 
164
 Government Response ibid, Annex A. 
165
 ibid, 1.2. 
166
 Ibid, 2.1. 
167
 Ibid, 3.1. 
168
 Ibid, 4.10. 
169
 Ibid. 
170
 Ibid, 3.7. 
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revision of the statutory code of practice for regulators, the Regulators’ Compliance Code.
171
 
A key principle of the newly-published Regulators’ Code, to which regulators are required to 
have regard in the adoption of policies and procedures supporting performance of their 
duties, is that ‘regulators should carry out their activities in a way that supports those they 
regulate to comply and grow’.
172
 This entails avoiding the imposition of unnecessary 
burdens, considering ‘whether similar social, environmental and economic outcomes could 
be achieved by less burdensome means’; and selecting ‘proportionate approaches to those 
they regulate, based on relevant factors including, for example, business size and 
capacity’.
173
 It moreover requires regulators, in designing and reviewing their policies, 
procedures and practices, to evaluate the extent to which they promote economic growth, 
for instance by minimising the costs of compliance and the ‘negative economic impacts of … 
regulatory activities’.
174
 
 
  IV(c)(ii) Waste policy and economic growth 
This co-option of regulatory protection interests into the economic growth agenda, although 
somewhat nascent, seems set to curtail rather than strengthen the likelihood of 
environmental claims featuring widely in corporate insolvencies. The link between 
environmental and economic interests is further supported by the development of policies 
surrounding the prevention and reuse of waste.  The Government has identified a crucial 
priority to boost economic growth ‘whilst continuing to improve the environment’ through 
                                                                 
171
 Ibid, 1.2; Part 2 Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. 
172
 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Regulators’ Code (Crown, 2014), 3. 
173
 Ibid, 1.1. 
174
 Ibid, 1.2. 
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the development of ‘a more resource efficient, circular economy’.
175
  Effective waste 
prevention, reduction and reuse will not only enable businesses to make a major 
contribution to the economy, but also create savings capable of enhancing their financial 
position and competitiveness.
176
 Added benefits include generating opportunities for the 
development of innovative products, technologies and services; and reducing the 
environmental impact of waste in the form of carbon emissions and the use of hazardous 
materials.
177
 Similarly, the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee has 
stressed that ‘environmental and economic imperatives need not be seen to be in conflict’ in 
the context of waste policy,
178
 as a waste-based bioeconomy can yield significant financial 
returns and support employment.
179
 The Government has adopted
180
 the Committee’s 
recommendation that responsibility for championing waste as a resource, coordinating 
activities across Government, and producing a long-term plan to support the extraction of 
maximum value from waste be conferred on a Minister in the Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills (‘DBIS’).
181
 This accords with the Conservative Party 2020 Group’s 
proposals for the reform of waste policy.
182
 The Group notes the advantages of treating 
waste ‘as a business opportunity that can drive higher profits for UK businesses’ through the 
reduction and reuse of inputs,
183
 and the emergence of new markets for products derived 
                                                                 
175
 HM Government, Prevention is better than cure: The role of waste prevention in moving to a more resource 
efficient economy (Crown, 2013), 5.   
176
 Ibid, 25. Waste hierarchy outlined in Directive (EC) 2008/98/EC on waste [2008] OJ LOJ L 312, 22.11.2008, 
Article 4. 
177
 Prevention is better than cure (n.175), 10-11.  
178
 Waste or resource? Stimulating a bioeconomy HL Paper 141 (Stationery Office, 2014), 5. 
179
 Ibid, [150]. 
180
 Government Response to the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee Report: ‘Waste or 
resource? Stimulating a bioeconomy’ (2014); S. Inglethorpe, ‘Fallon gains new role as BIS “waste champion”’ 
ENDS (23 June 2014). 
181
 Waste or resource (n.178), [148].  
182
 Sweating our Assets: Productivity and Efficiency Across the UK Economy (2020 Productivity and Efficiency 
Group, 2014).  
183
 Ibid, 19. 
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from waste.
184
 It consequently advocates that State policy regarding waste be re-designated 
‘resources’, with responsibility for its oversight and implementation transferred from Defra 
to DBIS where it would enjoy ‘strong sectoral support as a commercial opportunity’ rather 
than remaining confined to environmental considerations.
185 
 At European Union level, this 
outlook is expressed in policy moves aimed at transforming Europe ‘into a more competitive 
resource-efficient economy’ through measures including legislative proposals on waste 
targets.
186
 It is thus widely recognised that the exploitation of economic opportunities 
provided by waste can contribute to a reduction in landfill
187
 by diverting waste for the 
purpose of converting it into valuable assets,
188
 and promoting resource efficiency through 
the reuse/recycling
189
 and enhanced durability
190
 of products. Development of these policies 
may affect the incidence of claims arising from waste management operations, including 
potential civil claims arising from the effects of poor waste management on human 
health.
191
 It may furthermore assist in easing pressures on landfill operators: the financial 
distress and dissolution of companies in this sector has in the past been attributed to the 
weight of environmental protection requirements.
192
 
 
 
                                                                 
184
 Ibid, 20. 
185
 Sweating our Assets (n.182). 
186
 European Commission, ‘Closing the loop – An EU  action plan for the circular economy’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm (accessed 31 July 2016); Speech by 
Commissioner Vella at the 2015 European Circular Economy Conference, 5 March 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4559_en.htm (accessed 31 July 2016). See however S. 
Inglethorpe, ‘Government rejects circular economy policies’ ENDS (3 November 2014). 
187
 Sweating our Assets (n.182). 
188
 Waste or resource? (n.178), [9]. 
189
 European Commission, ‘Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe’ COM/2011/571 final, 8. 
190
 S. Inglethorpe, ‘DEFRA launches £0.8m fund for innovative waste prevention partnerships’ ENDS (29 May 
2014). 
191
 L. Rushton, ‘Health hazards and waste management’ (2003) 68 Br. Med. Bull. 183. 
192
 Shelbourn, (n.60).  
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  IV(c)(iii) The ‘natural capital’ movement 
These developments coincide with increasing interest in the ‘natural capital agenda’, 
whereby the UK’s ‘natural assets are valued in the same way as national infrastructure’.
193
 
Proponents argue that increasing the visibility of nature in an economic sense will help to 
prevent continued unsustainable levels of damage  by ensuring that all benefits attached to 
such assets are accounted for by valuing them, and using techniques  such as pollution taxes 
to avert a decline in their ‘overall amount and condition’.
194
 This would enable businesses to 
identify and avoid costly or hazardous risks and practices, for instance opting to develop 
brownfield sites rather than destroy woodland areas.
195
 Additional motivation may be 
provided in future by the introduction of environmental impact bonds, under which the 
government would contract to pay a certain amount in exchange for the fulfilment of 
environmental targets.
196
 
It has yet to be seen to what extent this growing consensus towards economic interests 
being promoted, rather than impeded, by environmental protection objectives (and 
contributing positively to the latter) will have a discernible or lasting impact. Will they, for 
example, boost the remediation of contaminated land by private developers, or the 
effectiveness of waste management? It is recorded that landowners are ‘sitting on two 
million acres of wasteland that could generate around £7 [billion] in natural capital’, and 
such financial values could inform decision-making regarding the management of such 
land.
197
 Importantly, would these developments affect companies of all sizes in equal 
                                                                 
193
 R. Salvidge, ‘Truss backs natural capital agenda’ ENDS (15 October 2015) – indicating that the UK’s natural 
assets were worth at least £1.6 trillion. 
194
 Ibid; R. Salvidge, ‘Valuing nature: a necessary evil’ ENDS (26 October 2015.) 
195
 Salvidge, ‘Valuing nature’, ibid. 
196
 Salvidge, ‘Truss backs…’ (n.193). 
197
 R. Salvidge, ‘Wasteland could generate £7bn in natural capital’ ENDS (12 October 2015) 
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measure? The ‘natural capital protocol’, aimed at enabling businesses to ‘assess and better 
manage their direct [and] indirect interactions with natural capital’ by providing guidance on 
valuing their impact and dependence on natural assets,
198
 is being developed by a coalition 
which focuses on ‘global stakeholder engagement’ and has many large (and multi-national) 
corporations among its members
199
 - more than 40 of whom have led the first trial of the 
protocol.
200
 Although the protocol promises to be useable ‘in different business applications’ 
at ‘different organizational levels’ in ‘all business sectors across all geographies’,
201
 it may 
prove difficult for an instrument of such breadth to meet the needs of a wide variety of 
business types and sizes. 
Arguably, the motivation for large companies to engage with such initiatives may stem more 
forcefully from their exposure to substantial criminal penalties for environmental offences 
(discussed in IV(b) above). Indeed, the Environment Agency’s director of legal services has 
also identified a significant effect of the introduction of the sentencing guidelines as being 
that ‘some previously intractable problems have been fixed, perhaps because the level of 
sanction has driven investment and creativity’.
202
 The extensive nature of these businesses’ 
operations means that the benefits of their improved compliance and handling of natural 
resources would have far-reaching effects. However, it is less clear what incentives would 
drive smaller businesses to embrace voluntary initiatives when their levels of compliance 
with statutory obligations are already a source of concern: recent research has established 
that 94% of businesses which fail to comply with their statutory obligations regarding the 
                                                                 
198
 http://www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org/natural-capital-protocol.html (accessed 31 July 2016). 
199
 Including Burberry, Coca-Cola, Marks and Spencer, Nestle, Novartis, Roche, Shell, Skanska, Tata, WalMart: 
http://www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org/about/coalition-members.html (accessed 31 July 2016). 
200
 R. Salvidge, ‘Multinationals pilot natural capital protocol’ ENDS (13 October 2015) – ‘companies trialling [the 
pilot programme] include the Coca-Cola Company, the Dow Chemical Co, F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Hugo Boss, 
Kering, Natura, Nespresso, Nestle, Olam International and Shell.’ 
201
 http://www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org/natural-capital-protocol.html (accessed 31 July 2016). 
202
 (n.152). 
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safe management of waste are small and medium-sized enterprises.
203
 The impact of the 
developments outlined above might therefore take some time to permeate all relevant 
types of business operations.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Ultimately, the issue of how the law can effectively respond to situations where a company 
which is subject to environmental obligations becomes insolvent should be addressed, in 
particular the question whether it calls for resolution through legislative reform. This paper 
questions the urgency of such reform, taking account of the extent to which certain 
mechanisms within the framework of environmental protection already play a part in 
tempering the danger of (or necessity for) a company to rely on insolvency proceedings for 
shelter from such liabilities. There is room to explore the scope for these, and any other 
mechanisms, to be developed in a way that more strongly supports the diminution of this 
insolvency risk – without compromising the goal of environmental protection.  
It is accepted that the mechanisms considered above are not without their weaknesses. 
These include the complexity of the Part 2A regime for dealing with historic 
contamination,
204
 the uncertainty resulting from the looming cessation of State funding for 
investigation and remediation of sites under the regime,
205
 and the public cost incurred due 
                                                                 
203
 See awareness-raising campaign managed by Environmental Services Association  - 
http://www.rightwasterightplace.com/news/2016/4/11/duty-of-care-awareness-campaign-launched-as-
research-suggests-56-of-uk-businesses-are-not-complying-with-the-law (accessed 31 July 2016); C. McGlone, 
‘Waste industry launches SME campaign to tackle waste crime’ ENDS (12 April 2016). 
204
 Fogleman, (n.85). 
205
 S. Evans, ‘Death knell for Part 2A funding’ ENDS (10 December 2013); Examination of contaminated land 
sector activity in England and Wales – SP1011 (Cranfield University, C.L.A.I.R.E., 2014); R. Salvidge, 
‘Contaminated land figures contested as remediation funding dries up’ ENDS (22 April 2015); G.Simkins, ‘Wales 
slow to remediate contaminated land’ ENDS (21 April 2016). 
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to the apparent generosity of local authorities’ application of the hardship criteria in their 
decisions regarding recovery of remediation costs.
206
 The financial downturn has 
furthermore hampered the ability of developers to undertake voluntary remediation 
through the planning regime,
207
 while governmental funding for tackling waste crime seems 
limited.
208
 
On the basis of the factors considered in Part IV above, it may however be doubted whether 
evidence could be found depicting the widespread evasion or discharge of environmental 
claims through insolvency proceedings in the UK. Moreover, insofar as these factors shed 
some light on the ways in which environmental law and policy can be (and is) employed in 
the balancing act between the goal of environmental protection and the survival of 
companies, they helpfully restore the focus on the ability of the enforcement framework to 
support companies in preventing and remedying environmental damage. An approach that 
aims at strengthening these efforts would help to steer the debate away from the apparent 
inadequacy of the insolvency legislation to ensure that a debtor’s environmental obligations 
are fulfilled. This could in time lead to the insolvency legislation being regarded as playing a 
residual role, intervening as a last resort where the most robust policy and legal safeguards 
have failed. Even then, the liquidation of a company would not necessarily preclude the 
restructuring or sale of its business/assets with a view to ensuring that the elements which 
require in-depth restoration can gradually be taken over by the purchaser – as witnessed in 
the sale of assets by the `Scottish Coal Company and Aardvark (TMC) Ltd, whereby mining 
activities in problematic sites owned by the two companies would initially be supported by 
                                                                 
206
 Lees, (n.100). 
207
 A. Wiseman, ‘Getting to grips with the new land remediation guidance’ ENDS (Special Report, October 
2013). 
208
 I. Kaminski, ‘No clear funding for new DEFRA waste crime pledges’ ENDS (9 September 2014). 
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the company which had purchased the companies’ viable sites.
209
 In due course, if the 
‘outstanding restoration issues were resolved on commercially acceptable terms’ the 
purchaser would take over the two companies’ interests in the problematic sites and 
integrate them into its corporate group.
210
 The task of calibrating the ideal balance between 
striving for the highest degree of environmental protection, and curbing the negative effects 
of a company’s failure, will be of prime importance in the future development of this area of 
law.  
  
                                                                 
209
 See news releases by HSP: Acquisition of Assets from Aardvark (TMC) Ltd (16 May, 2013) and Acquisition of 
Assets from The Scottish Coal Company Ltd  (5 July, 2013) - available from 
http://www.hsgplc.co.uk/investors/regulatory-news.aspx (accessed 31 July 2016). 
210
 Ibid. 
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